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MODERN THEORIES OF JUDGMENT.

“THE figure of the mind receiving impressions is one of those images which have rooted themselves forever in language,”¹ and expresses likewise the presupposition of many epistemologists. They assume that the first experience is the presence in consciousness of a subjective state which has arisen through the action of an external object on the mind. This state is taken to be the *datum* on which the mind reacts, and by means of which it passes to a knowledge of the object. Knowing is assumed to consist in objectifying the subjective, or in using the subjective in such a way that a knowledge of reality is obtained. States of consciousness are produced by the object, and hence represent it; but their meaning is superinduced upon them by the mind when it uses them as copies, signs, symbols, or qualities of the real world. It is our purpose, then, in this paper, to attempt to show that, if the first experience is a mere subjective state of consciousness, no mental activity can objectify it, or construct out of it a system of knowledge. This state will remain subjective if it is ever merely subjective.

In the first place, let us briefly review this uncritical psychology, and examine some of the presuppositions which underlie it and are carried over into logic. A fundamental fact of consciousness is the distinction between subject and object. Every one is immediately aware that he is different from the object which he knows. Now, the earliest form in which this distinction is recognized is spatial separation. But this primitive form of the distinction between subject and object is taken by many as essential, and the knower and the known are then both regarded as objects in space. They stand over against each other, and take their respective places in the phenomenal system. This, indeed, is the way subject and object appear to an outside observer who knows both as objects in his objective world. To the observer, knower and known are both equally objects, the one located in space be-

¹ Jowett, *Dialogues of Plato*, 3d Ed., Vol. IV, p. 151.

side the other. They are spatially exclusive. The observer perceives that these two objects belong to the phenomenal world, and are, therefore, related just as any objects are related. He then tries to see how they are related. He is aware that the subject knows the object, and proceeds to discover how this comes about.

Thus arises the scientific solution of a logical problem. Regarding subject and object from the point of view of an outside observer, the scientist endeavors to reveal the conditions and circumstances under which the subject knows. As he is only an observer, he sees nothing from within, but all from without; he sees subject and object in spatial relation; further, he is aware that they are connected by a medium (ether, air, etc), and are, therefore, capable of acting on one another. Now, since interaction is possible, he concludes that knowing is only a special case of this general principle. The object acts upon the mind through the senses, and produces impressions, which are regarded as images, or subjective states of consciousness, that exist in the mind just as a quality exists in an object. These images or sensations are the *data* of knowledge, and are used in the following way: The observer finds that the image in consciousness is the effect of a cause out of consciousness. Since, however, he knows both the image and its cause, he perceives that the image is a member in a causal series, and has, therefore, a reference beyond itself to the object which produced it. Thus he concludes, that by knowing the image he knows the object, as from knowledge of an effect he can know the cause. Though this may be a good descriptive account from the standpoint of an observer, it does not satisfy the subject which knows and sees its object from within. The observer can see only the subject's object, but the subject is its own observer, and the process of knowing does not appear to the subject as it appears to an onlooker. Logic is an immanent appreciation of judgment, and not an external description of how one body acts on another.

The latter presupposition is present, often in a disguised form, in many theories of knowledge. It may be put thus: In space are objects, some of which are conscious and know the others. By means of media they are related, and act on one another.

But the action of a thing on the conscious object produces in the latter a change which is a state of it. The logical problem now arises: How does this state of consciousness serve as a means to the knowledge of the object which is outside? Or, in what way can the mind go from the image to the object? Thus arises the problem of passing from the subjective to the objective. As the answers have been many, we propose to begin with Locke and trace the solution through some of its phases, considering only its relation to judgment, and the various conceptions of judgment.

Locke starts out with a non-cognitive state or idea, and tries to show how knowledge arises and what is the nature of the proposition (judgment). Ideas "being nothing but bare appearances or perceptions in our minds cannot properly and simply in themselves be said to be true or false." They are mere states of consciousness, the so-called psychological ideas, and remain such until the mind uses them as logical ideas by referring them to something else. In the act of reference or judgment, which Locke calls proposition (reserving the term judgment, in general though not always, for that body of opinion which supplies "the absence of clear and distinct knowledge"), ideas become true or false. "For truth or falsehood lying always in some affirmation or negation, mental or verbal, our ideas are not capable, any of them, of being false till the mind passes some judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies something of them." Judgment, therefore, changes mental states into logical ideas, and is coextensive with truth and falsehood. Ideas when used in judgment become signs or symbols of things, and their meaning depends on judgment.¹ But it may seem that Locke was not concerned with the relation of ideas to reality, and that he restricted knowledge to ideas. Some isolated passages appear to show this. For in judging, he says, the mind joins and separates ideas on the perception of their agreement or disagreement; or again, he says, the mind is conversant about ideas and their relation to one another. But this is no sooner stated than he hastens to correct this provisional definition of knowledge. Though knowledge was

¹ Cf. *Essay*, II, xxxii, 1-3, 19-24; also IV, xiv.

defined as "the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas," he adds that this agreement is fourfold, and that one phase of it is that the true idea agrees with an 'actual and real existence.' If there were not this agreement of the idea with reality, judgment would not have transformed the mental state into a cognitive idea, nor have given it the power to be true or false. "Truth, then, seems to me . . . to signify nothing but the joining or separating of signs, as the things signified by them do agree or disagree one with another. The joining or separating of signs here meant is what by another name we call proposition [judgment]. So that truth properly belongs only to propositions." On this view of judgment, which begins with subjective states, all that is really present in the mind are ideas, and things are known only inferentially. "It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things."¹ Here we have the doctrine of 'representative perception' in its most obvious form. But it was soon found to contain a fundamental difficulty, in that there is no criterion by which we can know whether our ideas are copies of things.

This theory, as has been seen, starts with non-cognitive mental states, and, by using them as copies in the case of primary qualities, and as symbols in the case of secondary qualities of matter, seeks to obtain in consciousness a knowledge of reality outside. But we wish to show that, whatever way these states of mind are used, they remain purely subjective, and are unable to go beyond themselves. To use them as copies or symbols is impossible, for there is no way of knowing whether they are copies or symbols. They may bear the likeness of reality and they may not, but whether they possess this character can never be known. For to compare them with reality presupposes a knowledge of reality in some other way, which *ex hypothesi* we do not have. Berkeley and Hume saw that this theory of judgment fails to give any account of reality, and we need only mention their theories to show that representative perception cuts the ground from underneath

¹ *Essay*, II, xxxii; IV, i, 1-7; ii, 14; iv, 1-3, 11-12; v, 1-2.

itself. Hume's skepticism is the logical outcome of this doctrine. Both Berkeley and Hume urge that if knowledge begins with a subjective state it ends with the same. The latter says: "But to form the idea of an object, and to form an idea simply, is the same thing; the reference to an object being an extraneous denomination of which in itself it bears no mark or character."¹ Berkeley also shows convincingly that there is no way to get beyond ideas, and that an idea cannot refer to anything which is not an idea.² On any theory of representative perception which begins with a mere state of consciousness, reality, being outside of ideas, is unknowable.

Reid saw that the source of error lay in representative perception; but, as we shall see, he overlooked the real basis of the 'ideal theory.' Locke held that the mind is directly conversant about ideas only, and that we know things indirectly, or in so far as our ideas are copies or signs of them. This doctrine, Reid perceived, led logically to skepticism, and its consequences induced him "to call in question the principles commonly received with regard to the human understanding." Reid puts the question to himself: "What evidence have I for this doctrine, that all the objects of my knowledge are ideas in my own mind?"³ By an appeal to consciousness, he finds there is no evidence for this assumption, and thus strikes directly at the presuppositions of the 'ideal theory.' Common sense, he declares, shows that the mind does not first have ideas, and then predicate them of reality. On the contrary, the mind is never closed within a system of ideas, but in its earliest act apprehends reality. The simplest act of the mind is judgment. "Every operation of the senses, in its very nature, implies judgment or belief as well as simple apprehension," and "we ought rather to say that the simple apprehension is performed by resolving and analyzing a natural and original judgment." The mind in judgment, as Reid conceives, goes directly to the object, and makes it the subject of the predication. "We are never restricted to our own ideas, as ideas; from the first

¹ *Treatise*, Bk. I, pt. i, § 7; pt. iv, § 2.

² *Principles of Human Knowledge*, §§ 8 ff.

³ Reid, *Works* (Hamilton's Ed.), p. 282; cf. also pp. 7, 91-109.

dawn of knowledge we treat the subjective excitation as the symbol or revealer of a real world.”¹ But in order to see more precisely what Reid means, let us examine his theory more in detail. Reid makes generic distinctions between sensations, perceptions, and ideas ; whereas Locke uses ‘idea’ for all three modes. Although, to be sure, Reid refined Locke’s terminology, he in general assumes that Locke’s use of idea is the same as his own. By an ‘idea,’ Reid means ‘simple apprehension,’ not a *datum* or sensation. An idea for him is what Bradley calls a ‘floating adjective,’ and consequently it is easy to show that ideas are obtained through an analysis of judgment, and are not in the mind before it has made a judgment about reality.² Hence the ‘ideal theory,’ which teaches that the first operation of the mind is *about* its ideas, is refuted. But the problem is removed only one step back. When, however, Reid had shown that in judgment the mind does not first entertain ideas, and then predicate them of reality, he believed that the foundations of representative perception were demolished. But he overlooked its real basis, and his own generic distinction between sensation and perception, which he thought the chief merit of his theory, rooted the assumptions of representative perception firmer than ever. He thought the basis of the ‘ideal theory’ consisted in the doctrine that we have a knowledge of ideas directly and of things indirectly ; but he did not see that the real assumption with which Locke begins, and on which the ‘ideal theory’ rests, is that the first experience is a sensation or mere subjective state impressed on the mind through the senses by an object independent of the mind. Representative perception rests on the assumption that the beginning of experience is a sensation, and that knowing consists in going beyond this *datum* to reality. This supposition Reid made. It is concisely stated in the above quotation from Professor Seth. Judgment, says Reid, does not presuppose ideas, but precedes them ; it does, however, begin with a sensation, a non-cognitive, subjective state of mind. Sensation is the *datum* ; perception is what judgment reaches *through* sensation. Sensation is subjective, perception objective. “ They are as unlike . . . as pain is to the point of a sword.”³

¹ Seth, A., *Scottish Philosophy*, p. 103.

² Reid, *Works*, pp. 360 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 128. Cf. pp. 258–260, 310–313.

Reid has, therefore, the same problem as Locke—to pass from the subjective to the objective, or to get perception out of sensations. He solves it by emphasizing the activity of the mind which, he imagined, was able to leap over the chasm. The *activity* of the mind goes beyond sensations. Its first act on sensation is judgment. The “sensation taken by itself implies neither the conception nor belief of an external object,” but is a ‘natural sign’ by means of which the mind passes immediately to a knowledge of the object without even perceiving the sensation. In judgment, the mind uses the sensation as a sign which suggests, through “the original constitution of our minds,” the external object. “A sensation of touch suggests hardness, although it hath neither similitude to hardness, nor, as far as we can perceive, any necessary connection with it.” This, then, is Reid’s epistemology. The subjective states are signs of objective qualities. When, however, Reid is asked what criterion there is that the sign suggests the right quality and the right object, he falls back on “the original constitution of our minds,” which is supposed to take care of the matter and silence all doubts.¹

Moreover, this theory fails in Reid’s own hands. He is so anxious to maintain a generic distinction between sensation and perception, making the former a sign of the object, that his position becomes untenable. In his discussion of smell, he says the sensation is the odor, and yet maintains that the smell is in the object; but when he is asked what the odorific quality is, as distinct from the sensation, he can reply only: “There is a quality or virtue in bodies, which we call their smell.”² This quality or virtue is, therefore, the unknown cause of our sensations, and Reid admits this when discussing the nature of heat and cold. He says: “The sensations of heat and cold are perfectly known; for they neither are nor can be anything else than what we feel them to be; but the qualities in bodies which we call *heat* and *cold*, are unknown. They are only conceived by us as unknown causes or occasions of the sensations to which we give the same names. But, though common sense says nothing of the nature of these qualities, it plainly dictates the existence

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 114–122.

² *Ibid.*, p. 112.

of them.”¹ This, then, is Locke’s ‘representative perception’ over again, and is additional evidence that, if the first experience is merely subjective, reality remains unknowable. The logical outcome of Reid’s position, as well as that of Locke’s, is Hume’s skepticism.

In spite of Reid’s protest against representative perception, English thought continued along the lines laid down by Locke, for Reid had not exposed its real nature. The interests of English philosophers were chiefly psychological, and ideas were taken as events in consciousness rather than as cognitive. Thus the prejudice that ideas are mental states apart from reality, and as such neither true nor false, has grown strong, though the naïve spatial conception has begun to give way. This view of knowledge was opposed by Ferrier, Green, and Bradley, and their philosophy may be regarded as a revolt from phenomenalism. We shall confine our attention to Mr. Bradley.

Convinced that there is a reality beyond ideas and that mental states are not copies of reality, and are not adjectives, or qualities which can be attributed to reality, Bradley struck out on a line of criticism which has done much to clear up the logical problem. He shows the absurdity of holding that the idea we have of reality is the psychological image. And he has done much also to clear up the nature of the psychological process itself by showing that ideas are not atomic, but form a system which alone makes consciousness possible. But granting that his psychology is correct, and that he has shown that every idea belongs to a unitary function of consciousness, still, we claim that from his point of view this system of ideas is merely subjective, a little world in itself. We cannot see how mental phenomena, occurring in an individual mind, can be used in judgment to gain objective truth from subjective facts. Bradley’s account of the process is something like this: Mental states are the medium of knowledge; but as mental states they are non-cognitive and subjective. Reality is outside of these states. It is substantive, self-existent, and individual, but is known through images, though

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 135–138, 140–147. Cf. also Seth, *Scottish Philosophy*, pp. 88–95.

independent of them. As there is a system of events in consciousness, and also another reality out of consciousness, the problem arises: How can reality be known? There are objects out of consciousness which we wish to know; there are other objects in consciousness called images. Evidently the latter are the means by which the former are known. But how? In every judgment a quality or idea is predicated of reality. But it cannot be an idea 'in my head,' because this idea is a 'fact' (noun), and an adjective is wanted. The psychical idea is an image, a concrete particular, and we need an universal. It is itself an object of knowledge, and has existence and content. In order to be able to know reality, the image must sacrifice itself, and attain, through self-denial, the dignity of meaning. But the image itself cannot have a meaning, or be used to qualify reality. To receive a meaning it must be torn to pieces, and a common element fixed by the mind taken for an adjective. Since, now, the image is dismembered, it is no longer an individual, and being only an element or abstract, it can qualify many things, and so is universal. And this universal is not a fact or event, but a logical idea.¹ The logical idea, however, cannot stand alone since it is an adjective, and, further, it can work only through the image. First, it is derived from the image by abstracting a part of the image and fixing it in the mind. Secondly, it depends for its use on the image, for it is only through the image that the mind is called to think the logical idea. "The idea, in the sense of mental image, is a sign of the idea in the sense of meaning."² Now we have all the equipment for knowing reality. Therefore, since judgment is the act of knowledge, "judgment proper is the act which refers an ideal content (recognized as such) to a reality beyond the act." The 'ideal content' is that for which the image stands; an universal idea or 'wandering adjective.' Hence the mechanism of judgment consists of reality, a wandering adjective, and an image. The image stands for the adjective, and the adjective is referred to reality. The image is known directly, the adjective indirectly, and reality at third hand. On this view, there is no evidence that

¹ *Principles of Logic*, pp. 2-9, 35-39, 273-321.

² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

the image is a sign of the right meaning, and no criterion that an adjective floating in consciousness refers to reality, or can in any way qualify it. The mental process is, apart from reality, merely subjective, and there is no way out. To fall back on the statement that ideas can refer to a reality beyond themselves is a return to representative perception.¹

We have now traced briefly the attempts of some eminent English logicians to give a theory of knowledge. They all begin with the psychological idea, and endeavor to avoid phenomenalism by a remodeling of this *datum*. The problem is to change an impression into a cognitive idea; but no clear account of this process is anywhere given. Locke and Reid attempted none; Bradley grapples with the problem, and gets the logical idea by abstraction. But he forgets that abstraction is not creative, and can only discover an idea. If the idea is abstracted from the image, then the image is already potentially an idea. Or, we may say that the universal gotten by a process of abstraction is an abstract universal, which is, therefore, no universal at all, but a particular.² Moreover, all such theories ultimately fall back on representative perception; and, further, if the impression is at first a *datum*, and has to be used by thought, there is no guarantee that the work of the mind will tell us anything about the object whether it uses the impression as a copy or sign of reality. No amount of remodeling of a subjective state will make it more than an event in consciousness. Another way in which Hume was answered arises now for consideration. It is evident that, if an answer is to be given, it must abandon that psychological point of view which looks upon ideas as primarily states of consciousness. Has any theory successfully done this?

A presupposition in logical theory, which has already been noticed, comes more especially to light when we examine the German answer. It is this, that in knowledge there are two distinct elements: that which is given by the object, and that contri-

¹This symbol-form of representative perception is found in Locke (*Essay*, II, xxx, 2), and in Reid (*Works*, pp. 121-122).

²Cf. Hegel, *Encyclopædie*, § 80; Nettleship, *Philosophical Lectures*, Vol. I, pp. 219-224.

buted by the mind. The sensation is still regarded as the starting point, and knowledge arises through the reaction of the mind upon it. But now the transformation is so complete that the idea or phenomenon bears no resemblance to the *datum*. Kant follows Locke and Hume in presupposing subjective states as *data* for knowledge; but he thought he had answered Hume when he exhibited the necessity of the mind's synthetic activity. But as he began with a manifold of subjective states, he ends with a system of such states. Further, Kant affirms that we cannot know reality; for the mind so changes the *data* that we do not know in what relation they stand to reality. Again, so far as knowledge goes, there is no need to know it, for the world of experience is phenomenal. But even though we accept the phenomenal for the real world, we find within this system, cut off from reality, a curious difficulty analogous to the one we have been considering. Here, also, the antithesis of subjective and objective meets us as it must on the datum-theory.¹ Though reality is unknowable, Kant finds an objectivity in the articulated phenomenal world. But this objectivity arises out of the "internal determinations of our mind," which are only subjective, and out of which the world of knowledge is built up. The mind reacts on these states, and constructs the concept of an object, which, if true, agrees with the object. By this Kant means that, if the presentations are united into a necessary order or system, then this system *in the mind* is true because it accords with the necessary conditions of the object; that is, it has been thought under the categories. This categorizing or objectification of the subjective is judgment. It is the synthetic act of consciousness which changes a subjective manifold into a phenomenal unity which is universal. "A judgment is nothing but the way in which given ideas are brought to the objective unity of apperception."²

Kant's epistemology, though suggestive of the true solution, is encumbered with the doctrine of the subjective state, and, taken

¹ This distinction within the phenomenal world gave rise to the new use of 'subjective' and 'objective.'

² *Kr. d. r. V.*, Second Deduction, § 19. Cf. also *Kr. d. r. V.* (Müller's trans.), Vol. II, pp. 172-3; also *Proleg. to Metaph.*, §§ 13, 18, 19; also Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. I, pp. 365-380.

as an escape from subjectivity, fails. Non-cognitive states of consciousness are not even consistent with his phenomenal system ; but are the inevitable consequence of his notion that the matter of knowledge is given by the thing-in-itself which is unknowable. Kant accepts the naïve view that matter supplies the mind with the *data* of knowledge, but not with knowledge. A small modification, however, of Kant's conception of the nature of judgment, by the neglect of the noumenal object, and also by the rejection of the *a posteriori* element as distinct from the *a priori*, which are not essentially connected with his theory of judgment, would, it seems to me, lead to the true conception of thought and its object. Kant, however, retained his hold, on the thing-in-itself as the unknowable object which contributed the matter of knowledge, and thus in a sense his theory forfeits all claim to serious consideration ; the real object which we want to know is unknowable. But with Kant the datum-theory does not become representative perception, because he renounces all claims to knowledge of reality. This confession of impotence saves him. The logical outcome of this position, however, as will be seen in the systems of Lotze and Sigwart, where knowledge means knowledge of reality, is representative perception. Kant's epistemology, therefore, differs from that of the English school, in that no attempt is made to use the subjective as the means of passing to a knowledge of reality. Reality is declared unknowable, and presentations are used in the web of appearance. There is no doctrine of the copy or symbol. The image does not stand for anything, but is the matter which thought weaves into the phenomenal world. There is, on the one side, reality, on the other, phenomena, each distinct ; and the one is not referred to the other. How this conception is used by Lotze may now be seen.

Kant started out with the notion that the *data* of knowledge are given, and that the mind pieces them together into the curtain of appearance behind which is the unknowable reality. This agnosticism is the inevitable consequence of making knowledge consist of the reaction of the mind on a *datum*. Lotze, however, takes up the problem in the Kantian form, and tries to show how knowledge of reality is possible. He does not admit that reality

is unknowable, yet he holds that the direct object of knowledge is phenomena and not reality. We shall briefly trace his theory of knowledge to see how he tried to overcome this difficulty.

For Lotze the essential nature of the self is practical rather than theoretical, and thought is only one instrument for securing the ends of the self-conscious *Ego*. Now, the function of practical life, as well as of thought, is to produce coherence among the states of consciousness. This coherence of ideas is a sort of internal mechanism which controls the organism by ideo-motor action. So far, then, as psychical mechanism accomplishes this end, it does the work of thought. But when experience becomes complex, a more efficient means than association is required to combine the states of consciousness into a coherent system. This more efficient instrument is thought. Thought unites ideas on the basis of their content. But before thought can compare and combine impressions according to their matters, it must objectify them. Consequently, the first act of thought is to convert impressions into ideas, to objectify the subjective, or to distinguish between subjective states and the matter to which they refer. This objective world, which can be named and to which we can point, is constructed out of sense-given *data*. It is the phenomenal and for knowledge the only world; and knowing proper consists in combining, by an inspection of their content, the states of consciousness into a coherent whole which is the same for everyone.¹ This act of thought is judgment; and since it operates by an examination of content, its function is to bring into consciousness the ground on which *this particular* mark "coheres with the rest of the content, and why this particular is privileged above all the others which remain absent, though as species of the same universal, they might equally well be present."² Judgment is concerned with the ground of particulars, with the relation between the concept as a whole and a particular mark or element, or it expresses "a relation between the matters of two ideas." The important point for Lotze is, that judgment deals with phenomena, and combines them into systems on the

¹ Cf. *Logic*, §§ 2-3, 121-122, 152-153, 306. On the subjective nature of the criterion. Cf. *Microcosmus*, Bk. II, Ch. V, §§ 1-2; also Jones, *Phil. of Lotze*, pp. 49-63.

² *Logic*, § 35.

basis of their content, and "in a form which, at the same time, expresses the ground of coherence in the matter combined."

A few words of criticism will show that Lotze has the same difficulty as Kant and the phenomenologists. The first experience, we have seen, is for Lotze a subjective state. This state is objectified by thought into the world of appearance; but behind appearance is reality. Like Kant, Lotze supposes that in knowing we have no direct contact with reality. Judgment, therefore, is not the reference of an ideal content to reality, but a consciousness of the objective connection between objects and their qualities, all of which are phenomenal. Moreover, Lotze is well aware that there is no escape from skepticism if "human knowledge is intended to be a copy of a world of things." But his own theory is only a new phase of representative perception, and makes appearance symbolic of the real world, even though it is not a copy of it.¹ Further, within the phenomenal system Lotze has the same difficulty as Kant had. There are subjective phenomena, the stream of ideas and combinations produced by psychical mechanism; and there are objective phenomena, or ideas and systems of ideas which thought constructs out of impressions. But how this change is produced we are not told. Hence it is seen that when reality is left out of account and an attempt made to confine knowledge to phenomena, a dualism arises between the *datum* and knowledge, of which there is no satisfactory explanation. But we cannot leave reality out of consideration, and Lotze grants as much. To admit reality, however, and confine knowledge to phenomena is to miss the true significance of knowledge. If there is reality, it is that which we want to know; but Lotze's datum-theory makes knowledge impossible.

When we pass to Sigwart we are still at the subjective point of view. Sigwart, however, shows a tendency to find in phenomena a counterpart or representation of reality. But the na-

¹Although Lotze says ideas are not copies of things, still for him they represent things, as the following passage will show: "Each several conjunction or separation or transformation of the phenomena which float before our consciousness, will in the character of a *consequence* bear witness to a definite process of change, though it may be of a different order, in the relations of that world of things which operates upon us." (*Logic*, § 328. Cf. also, *Metaphysic*, § 105; *Microcosmus*, Bk. IX, Ch. ii, § 2.)

ture of this relation, which he regards as a postulate, he leaves for metaphysic to solve. He believes that knowledge of ideas is true of the real world, but expressly says that ideas cannot be compared with things which exist apart from them. The subjective system is a closed circle, yet it refers beyond itself to an existent. And further, says Sigwart, any unbiased person "is impelled by a psychological necessity to objectify his sensations, and the thoughts relating to them, and to picture to himself a world to which he ascribes an existence independent of his subjective activity."¹ Though we naturally refer our subjective states to reality, yet Sigwart finds on a critical analysis of the problem that there is no proof that such a world exists, and that even though it does exist the criterion of knowledge cannot be made the agreement of ideas with reality. A comparison of ideas with reality is impossible, and some other ground of the objective validity of subjective states must be sought. "But it still remains open to us to acknowledge the existence of an external world which is the same for all, as a postulate of our search for science and knowledge which we cannot avoid believing, although we recognize that it is not self-evident."² This logical postulate is a metaphysical problem. But logic has no concern with 'metaphysical reality,' or the relation of ideas to reality. "It investigates thought as a subjective function, and can, therefore, decide nothing as to the significance of intuitions."³ The subject-matter of logic is within consciousness, and the task of logical thinking is to reach propositions or syntheses of ideas which are certain and universally valid. How, then, does knowledge arise out of sensation? Or how do sensations obtain objective validity? The postulate is that they convey knowledge of reality. Though we do not know how consciousness is related to reality, nor in what way reality acts upon it, nor whether our system of ideas is a copy or symbol of reality, still we postulate a connection and that reality is known. From this postulate we derive the formal criterion of a true synthesis of ideas. Hence, we

¹ *Logic* (English trans.), Vol. I, p. 6; Cf. also pp. 73-74, 306, 315-325.

² *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 322.

³ *Ibid.*, I, p. 82.

find that the true synthesis must be universal and necessary, for, since an external existence is assumed, "then it must be the same for all knowing and thinking subjects, and all who know the existent must think alike in reference to the same object. Thus, thought which knows the existent is of necessity a universally valid thought." The objective validity of thought means that we are compelled to think in this way, to have indissoluble trains of ideas. "We may then unhesitatingly say that if all we can attain to is but necessary and universally valid thought, then knowledge of the existent is included therein, and when we think with the object of knowing our immediate aim is nothing more than this necessary and universally valid thought."¹ But this criterion that our thought is true of reality when it is universal and necessary, is only formal and rests upon a real criterion. These sensations or syntheses of sensations into complexes occur in the minds of the individual and are subjective. Since, however, there is no means of comparing reality with subjective phenomena, the necessity which is the condition of reality must be subjective also. This subjective criterion shows itself through the 'inward feeling of certainty' which accompanies an indissoluble or necessary synthesis of ideas.²

Let us see now what is the function of judgment. It is wholly within the phenomenal world. Thought uses the *data* given in sense, and by means of the categories constructs objects, attributes, and activities. Thus arise ideas of objects, qualities, and relations, which are formed for the most part unconsciously. When the mind becomes conscious of, and can retain in memory these concepts, it possesses the elements required for judgment. Now, when a sensation is given in sense, it is immediately enriched through associated ideas, and becomes a larger idea. But a mind capable of judgment has a concept of this larger or enriched idea, and also the concept and name of the quality or sensation which is given in sense. The concept of the total complex is the subject, and the sensation is the predicate. Judgment, there-

¹ *Ibid.*, I, p. 8; Cf. also pp. 81, 324.

² *Ibid.*, I, p. 15. This resort to feeling for a test of truth reminds us of Mr. Balfour's *Foundations of Belief*, and Professor James's essay, *The Sentiment of Rationality*.

fore, unites these two ideas with the consciousness that the part is united with the whole in a necessary way ; or we may say the essence of judgment is "the synthesis of a subject and predicate accompanied by the consciousness of objective validity."¹

That this theory of judgment has many difficulties must be admitted. Sigwart himself grants as much when he says that the mind must abide within ideas, and that there is only a subjective certitude resting in feeling that a particular judgment is valid. When he faces the question whether reality is more than subjective, he says we do not know. All we have is a postulate. There may be an outer reality and there may not. We can equally well accept realism or subjective idealism.² Furthermore, according to this theory, judgment, being only a subjective synthesis, is on a par with psychological association and unites only states of consciousness. The logic of these principles seems to compel Sigwart to disown the claims of reality. If, indeed, he gives up reality, knowledge is unmeaning ; if he retains it, the only form of knowledge is representative perception.

We have now seen the attitude of English and German thought to the problem of knowledge. English logicians, on the one hand, have insisted that we know reality. On the other hand, Kant, Lotze, and Sigwart have shown that knowledge is a mental construction, and that the world we see and feel is real ; but they assume a reality behind the appearance. The contention that reality is known we must admit. Furthermore, it must be allowed that knowledge is an ideal construction. These two points of view, emphasized by English and German philosophers respectively, seem quite indispensable for a theory of judgment, and must be synthetized. Their synthesis has been performed by Bosanquet. He maintains that knowledge is of reality, and that we know the thing itself. Moreover, he vindicates the synthetic activity of thought, and holds that knowledge is an intellectual construction. In this way, he unites the truth in two partial conceptions of judgment, while he omits the superfluous notion of Kant and his school that the known world has behind

¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 233 ; also pp. 79, 309 ; Vol. II, pp. 7, 79, 82-83.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 82 ; Vol. II, p. 236.

it the true reality. In order to see how Bosanquet has accomplished this task, let us briefly state his conception of judgment. It must not be forgotten, however, that to Bradley also is due, to some extent, the credit of this reform in logic. The earlier remarks in this article are not to be taken as a criticism of Bradley's work as a whole. They concern only some presuppositions in his notion of judgment which, as they stand, seem to reduce his system of judgment to a modified theory of representative perception.

Bosanquet begins by rejecting Bradley's doctrine of 'floating adjectives,' and holds that we cannot have an idea without judging. This criticism Bradley admits in a later work.¹ According to Bosanquet, the idea is the judgment, and every judgment is knowledge or an interpretation of reality. "There is in knowledge no passage from the subjective to the objective, but a development of the objective." We are face to face with reality in every judgment (idea). Judgment is the unit of thought, and is not subsequent to ideas. Therefore "judgment always appears as a revelation of something which is in reality. It simply develops, accents, or gives currency to a recognized quality of the real." "Being distinctly aware of reality is another name for judgment." Hence in this theory the two aspects of judgment mentioned above are united.²

In raising any criticism of Bosanquet's masterly treatment of logic, we wish to say that we do so hesitatingly, and with full consciousness that many passages in his *Logic* can be cited which argue against the difficulties that we raise. Nevertheless we desire to examine some statements which seem out of place, and may well be due to the form of expression. They seem to be real difficulties, however, and point back to the old presupposition which has already been traced and shown to lead to representative perception. For this reason let us inquire a little more closely into his conception of knowledge. Although Bosanquet maintains that the fundamental act of thought is a judgment, he

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 365 f, 381, 395.

² Bosanquet, *Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 31-38, 81 ff, 381; also *Essentials of Logic*, pp. 22, 27 f, 40, 71.

seems to hesitate to say that the first *experience* is a judgment. Further, he appears to hold that there are in consciousness non-cognitive images which are not ideas. This follows from what he says about judgment and images. Judgment, he affirms, is coextensive with truth and falsehood; but in contradistinction to this he maintains that "a mere mental fact as such is not true or false." The image, therefore, appears to fall outside of judgment and to be a mere subjective *datum*. Though there are passages to the contrary which state that in every sensation ideal synthesis is contained, still we feel that there is a difficulty here which has not been adequately removed. Moreover, Bosanquet seems to make these non-cognitive images the point of departure for judgment; and apparently uses the same artifice as does Bradley to transform them into ideas.¹ The natural consequence of this datum-theory is that psychical images have a symbolic use in judgment, and that it is only by going beyond them that knowledge of reality can be obtained. But, as we have tried to show, the reference of an image to reality implies a criterion which, from the nature of the case, cannot be given unless we have already knowledge of reality. If this criticism of Bosanquet has been fair, it seems that he has not completely freed himself from the assumption that there is a given element in knowledge on which thought acts. If, indeed, we accept a non-cognitive *datum*, there is no escape from one or the other form of representative perception, either the copy-theory or the sign-theory.

In conclusion, let us notice how the problem has been restated. The present review of some prominent systems of logic shows that those theories, which begin with a subjective state and endeavor to make it cognitive of reality by an act of thought on it, attempt the impossible. But since the conception of development has arisen, this problem can be restated in such a way that a solution seems possible. The absurd hope of getting life out of dead matter has been abandoned in biology, but in return the conception of evolution and the unity of nature has made the 'synthesis

¹ Cf. *Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 33, 39, 42, 72 ff; *Essentials of Logic*, pp. 69, 74-79; *Psych. of the Moral Self*, pp. 11-21.

of life ' a real problem worth an investigation. It is also time that the equally futile hope were banished from logic, and the conception of development applied to every phase of mind in the endeavor to discover the unity in the lowest and highest mental experiences. The problem would thus become, to trace the function of judgment in every mode of consciousness, and to show that in the lowest form of sentiency is contained the potency of the highest thought, and that they differ in degree of development alone. Bosanquet comes nearest this point of view, but he seems to waver. He has shown that *thought* is a systematic unity, and that its highest and lowest activities equally belong to one intelligible system which is cognitive of reality ; but he hesitates to acknowledge that every mental function is likewise cognitive, and that there are no merely subjective non-cognitive states. Further, he seems to admit that there may be a *feeling* experience independent of thought, and that judgment arises only when thought reacts upon this *datum*. In contradistinction to this theory, however, we claim that no such division of consciousness can be made. Consciousness itself is a function of unity, and its lowest form (the so-called mere sentiency) is cognitive. Mind is an activity of judgment from the first, and in its earliest experiences knows reality, and is never the spectator of subjective states as such. It is the nature of consciousness to know reality, and its first experience brings it into conscious relation with objects or things themselves. Consequently the lowest form of mind does not lack any element which is active in developed consciousness. What this experience is like we may not know ; neither can the man live the life of the child. Nevertheless, we contend that it is a logical need to consider mind as such to be cognitive, and that it is never the subject of subjective states in the sense of non-cognitive ideas.

It may serve a practical need to mark off the various aspects of consciousness into sensation and ideation, but it must be remembered that this classification serves only a methodological purpose, and is not descriptive of the real nature of mind at any stage of its evolution. Moreover, if we accept the view that feeling or sensation is cognitive, the problem of converting impressions

into ideas, and using ideas as symbols or images of things, does not arise. Once the mind has an impression, it is cognitively related to reality and knows or misknows. The sensation received from the object is neither atomic nor merely subjective. It is already a perception, an incipient perception it may be, but a perception, which, through the synthetic activity of the mind, grows into a more definite percept. Its development is a growth, not a transformation. On this view, judgment is the essence of the first mental experience. Consequently, if there is any miracle in knowing, it is in having a state of consciousness. Once given such a state, a judgment about reality is made, and no further activity of thought is required to go from the sensation to the idea and from the idea to reality.

E. P. ROBINS.